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Abstract 
This study asks if infrahumanization a detectable individual trait, and how empathy and 
emotional literacy predict infrahumanization or emotional bias between groups. Black and white 
participants did not systematically attribute more distinctly human emotions to characters of 
different races in a series of vignettes, nor did cognitive empathy, empathic capacity, or anti-
social personality traits predict a difference in emotional bias. 
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Literature Review 
Humans have been preoccupied with what makes us human at least since we have been 
writing down our ideas, from Genesis to Aristotle and beyond. But with this distinction of 
humanity comes a darker question: do all humans have humanity? Are some more human than 
others? As far back as the mid-19th century, the word dehumanization has been used to explain 
this phenomenon (Dehumanize, 2015). 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘dehumanize’ as a transitive verb which means, 
“to deprive of human character or attributes” (Dehumanize, 2015). The American Psychological 
association focuses on the noun form, ‘dehumanization,’ when it defines the concept as, “any 
process or practice that is thought to reduce human beings to the level of mechanisms or 
nonhuman animals, especially by denying them autonomy, individuality, and a sense of dignity” 
(VandenBos & American Psychological Association, 2015). In other words, humans sometimes 
see other human beings as nonhuman animals, and use this worldview to explain away 
atrocities visited upon them.  
No wonder psychologists have put so much effort into explaining the phenomenon. 
According to Haslam (2013), current theories of dehumanization may be organized on three 
dimensions: (1) the antithesis of humanity, (2) the subtlety or explicitness of the 
dehumanization, and (3) the degree of the dehumanization, and whether it is relative or 
absolute.  The first dimension explains what humans are seen as, if not humans: either they will 
be likened to animals, or to objects. The second dimension explains how that dehumanization is 
expressed: are people outright saying that another group is ape-like, or are they simply not 
hiring them because they don’t think they’re capable of human levels or cognition and 
responsibility? The third dimension shows how much a group is dehumanized. Are out-group 
members somewhat human, or human-like, and can they be perceived as more or less human 
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based upon their appearance or actions; or are all members of the out-group not human, no 
matter how they present themselves (Haslam, 2013)? 
This three-dimensional framework transcends other organizations of dehumanization, 
such as whether it is based on race or nationality, or how it is applied politically and socially, and 
ties together sometimes disparate examples of dehumanization (Haslam, 2013). Interdisciplinary 
studies of dehumanization often identify very similar formulas of dehumanization with very 
different outcomes: for example, the Jim Crow South used African Americans as an economic 
tool to be exploited by whites, whereas Nazi Germany saw the Jewish people – and millions of 
other “undesirables” – as a problem to be exterminated. However, American Jews have 
historically been very keen to point out the parallels between the plights of African Americans in 
America vs. the Jewish people in Germany (Floyd-Thomas, 2014). In both cases, white Christians 
saw their out-group as animals – African Americans were generally referred to as apes, whereas 
Jews were called vermin – were very explicit in their dehumanization of the other group, and 
used an absolute formulation (Haslam, 2013). This framework allows us to view these instances 
of dehumanization similarly, despite the major differences between them. 
The framework also allows us to study dehumanization in a society where such ideas are 
often frowned upon, and in which people often try to hide their prejudices. Subtle or implicit 
forms of dehumanization may be studied alongside and contrasted against blatant forms of the 
phenomenon within the same theoretical framework (Kteily et al., 2015).  
Infrahumanization 
In 2000, Leyens et al. published research on a newly recognized phenomenon: 
infrahumanization. According to the researchers, infrahumanization occurs when members of 
an in-group do not realize the members of an out-group’s ability to possess or display emotions 
which are deemed uniquely human. By describing the out-group as only experiencing those 
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emotions that are universal to humans and animals, people categorize their in-group as having 
more human emotional reactions than people in the out-group. This is a judgement of the out-
group’s humanity: if they do not have human emotional reactions, they are by definition less 
human than the in-group (Leyens et al., 2000). This initial research has expanded to cover varied 
instances of intergroup bias, and covers issues of race, ethnicity and nationality. 
This is a subset of dehumanization. According to Haslam’s (2013) organization of the 
field, it contrasts humans with animals, as the out-group is seen as having emotions, but only 
those emotions which are present in animals as well as humans. Additionally, it is a subtle form 
of dehumanization, and has a relative framework, in which some out-groups may be more 
human (or less dehumanized) than others. 
Studies have found that infrahumanization occurs most often with groups who are 
highly relevant to each other, and particularly those who compete for resources. For example, in 
the original study, mainland Spaniards were asked to judge the emotions of people from the 
Canary Islands as a group. The islanders were considered as lower-status citizens with whom the 
Spaniards competed for jobs. When the Spaniards ascribed fewer secondary emotions to them 
in the study, it was an implicit sign of bias against the islanders, and the judgment that they 
were less human than the Spaniards (Leyens et al., 2000). Other researchers have found that 
less infrahumanization is exhibited toward people who are unfamiliar to the in-group, likely 
because there is less reason to dehumanize a group with which there is no competition or other 
relevant interest (Cortes et al., 2005). Furthermore, a third study found that French and German 
citizens, who have low conflict and relatively equal, high statuses in the world, tended to have 
low levels of infrahumanization, despite their very different nationalities and languages 
(Rohmann et al., 2009).  
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This phenomenon seems to happen both when judging the overall attributes of the out-
group and in-group (as in Leyens et al., 2000; Rohmann et al., 2009), and when judging 
individuals who happen to be in either the in- or out-group. For example, in Cuddy, Rock & 
Norton’s (2007) study, experiment participants exhibited infrahumanization toward just one 
person. In the study, participants were asked to read a fictitious article featuring a woman who 
lost her child during Hurricane Katrina, and then asked how strongly the mother felt certain 
primary and secondary emotions. The experimenters manipulated the in-group and out-group 
by indicating the mother’s race using a stereotypically black or white name, and had participants 
of multiple races. In their analysis, they found that both minority and white participants tended 
to attribute more secondary emotions to their own race, though the tendency for 
infrahumanization was much more pronounced for minority subjects than for white (Cuddy, 
Rock & Norton, 2007). The weakness of this experiment, of course, is that it was a between-
subjects design, and therefore could not capture individual differences in understanding of and 
attribution of secondary emotions. 
Of course, this type of prejudice may be problematic in individual settings as well as 
when judgements are made between large, generic groups. Particularly, Vaes et al. (2003) 
expanded the study of infrahumanization by looking at how subjects reacted when members of 
the outgroup display secondary, or uniquely human emotions. They found that when people 
complained, subjects would express more solidarity with those in the out-group who used 
primary emotions than those who used secondary emotions in their complaint. This implied that 
the subjects exhibited less empathy for out-group members who expressed secondary emotions 
than for either those who expressed only primary emotions, or for members of their own in-
group (Vaes et al., 2003). 
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Additionally, infrahumanization does not seem to be static, but something that may be 
changed through interventions. Past research has shown that racial bias itself is somewhat 
mutable, and may be increased or decreased in individuals. This was classically shown when 
dealing with more explicit out-group prejudice in the Robbers Cave Experiment (Sherif, Harvey, 
White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961), but has recently been proven to work with implicit prejudice as 
well. Hall, Crisp & Suen (2009) were able to show that encouraging perceptions of overlap 
between two groups by having participants ruminate on and list characteristics that they shared 
with an out-group lowered implicit prejudice toward the out-group.   
With regards to infrahumanization, researchers found that when the differences 
between French and German citizens were emphasized – that is, when people ruminated on 
their nationalism – they exhibited higher levels of infrahumanization toward each other. When 
they were then asked to ruminate on their shared European Union membership, 
infrahumanization lowered again (Rohmann et al., 2009). This suggests that infrahumanization 
may be exhibited at different levels between individuals, or that infrahumanization may be 
studied as an individual trait, instead of at the group-level, as it has been in much of the 
literature. 
Basic and Complex Emotions: What are They? 
The basis of infrahumanization is the difference between Basic or Primary Emotions and 
Complex or Secondary Emotions. Simply put, primary emotions are those that are universal to 
all mammals (such as fear or happiness), whereas secondary emotions are more complex 
emotions which are unique to humans (such as guilt or nostalgia) (Leyens et al., 2000). This 
categorization is sometimes controversial, mainly because a comprehensive list of primary 
emotions is impossible to compose.  
Constructionalist Theories of Emotional Experience 
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Many researchers have questioned whether or not some emotions are actually 
universal, and that the assumption of basic and non-basic emotions may not be as empirically 
evident as some researchers suggest. Constructionalists have argued that emotions are not 
actually distinct, but constructed by the individual’s experience of combinations of physiological 
processes, or instances of core affect (Russell, 2003; Russell, 2009; Barrett, 2011). According to 
these theories, there are no distinct basic emotions. Instead, there are physiological responses 
which may be present for many emotions, but which in combination create our emotional 
experiences. 
Constructionalists start with the question: what is an emotion? To answer the 
philosophical nature of this question, Barrett (2006) argued that if basic emotions are all of a 
specific category – a natural-kind in philosophical parlance – then they should share 
characteristics. Instead, what makes them basic according to biological theorists is that they 
have distinct characteristics: distinct facial expressions, distinct stimuli, distinct physiology, etc. 
However, they cannot be categorized based on their distinctness from one another or from 
other emotions, because even that is not exact: anger and panic may both increase heart rate, 
and a scowl may indicate anger or disgust. Indeed, these emotions may be in themselves the 
assumptions, constructs that we expect to find as opposed to distinct biological impulses – and 
this may be the reason why categorizing basic emotions are so difficult. When the theory 
precedes the data, it is usually difficult to make the data fit (Barrett, 2006).  
Although this seems like mainly a philosophical difference in categorical definitions, it 
leads to an interesting new approach. Instead of using pre-defined emotional constructs, such as 
anger, Barrett and other constructionists suggests looking at physiological outputs first, and as 
empiricists using that data to define what she calls “core affect.” Like basic emotions, core affect 
is a category of responses which are present in all mammals, and which are instinctive to 
 MEASUREMENTS OF EMOTIONAL ATTRIBUTIONAL BIASES         11  
 
 
 
humans (Barrett, 2006). A constructionist approach been developed in recent years which 
theorized a core affective system: a dual-axis matrix of neurobiological states, which are 
organized on Activation/Deactivation and Pleasant/Unpleasant continuums (Russell, 2003; 
Barrett, 2011).   
According to a newer model which has come from this research, the Conceptual Act 
Model, any given emotion may fluctuate upon these continuums, depending on the stimuli, but 
they are identified by the physiological instances of core affect that they induce (Barrett, 2011). 
This flows from the theoretical understanding that there are several ways to be angry, for 
example, but they all trigger a collection of specific responses, and we need only to recognize 
some of these responses in order to automatically categorize into anger. 
Appraisal Theory of Emotions 
There are also researchers who eschew biology and evolution as the theoretical 
foundations of emotion, and instead argue that cognitive processes should be focused on 
instead. These researchers attest that emotions are the results of cognitive processes by which 
an appraisal is made based on a specific stimulus.  They call these processes episodes, and 
categorize emotions based on the cognitive and physiological output of the episode. Some 
appraisalists categorize these episodes as the emotions we are more familiar with (love, fear, 
anger), whereas others look at emotional components, such as a flight or fight response (Moors, 
2014).   
Proponents of appraisal theory offer critiques of both biological theories of basic 
emotions and of constructionism. For one, basic emotion and constructionism theories both 
attest that emotions are byproducts of biology – that is, a stimulus creates a physiological or 
neurological response, which the individual then cognitively understands as an emotion. Their 
biggest quarrel is whether the responses (emotions) are distinct or not, and how to categorize 
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the physiological responses. Appraisal theory, on the other hand, is based upon the idea that 
appraisals, or cognitive processes, cause the biological emotional response (Moors, 2013).   
Proponents of appraisal theory offer critiques of both biological theories of basic 
emotions and of constructionism. For example, the two-dimensional matrix of arousal and 
pleasantness of constructionism is too simplistic for appraisal theory.  As far back as 1985, 
researchers have been decrying arousal and pleasantness as too confining for a theory of 
emotions, giving several possibly supplementary scales in their research (Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985). More recently, researchers have added a third continuum of unpredictability to account 
for these changes (Fontaine, Scherer, Roesch & Ellsworth, 2007) – which of course ties into how 
well a stimulus may be appraised before a reaction is made. No matter what dimensions are 
added, though, it seems that the constructionist theoretical underpinnings of emotion are too 
simple for an appraisal theory of emotions. 
More importantly for our understanding, the appraisal theory’s view of emotions does 
not leave much room for the distinction between basic and complex emotions. Like the 
constructionist view, the difference in emotional complexity is a valence issue: emotions may 
require more or less cognitive input in order to be understood, but at the end of the day, all 
emotions involve cognitive events (appraisals), and therefore there is no distinguishing line 
between basic and complex emotions. 
Emotional Heuristics and Infrahumanization 
Truthfully, we may never create a definitive model of basic emotions across cultural and 
lingual differences (Smith & Schneider, 2009; Barrett, 2006). However, the phenomenon of 
infrahumanization is still being recognized in research.  How is that?  
In actuality, a definitive emotional model is not necessarily a detriment to researching 
the effects of basic and complex emotions in individuals. Even while some researchers have had 
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trouble creating a universal taxonomy of emotions, they realize that humans by nature tend to 
lump emotions into categories of “basic” and “non-basic” even with evidence on their side 
(Barrett, 2006). Russell (2003) admitted that “The concepts of emotion, fear, anger, and so forth 
are parts of a folk theory inherited from human shepherding and farming ancestors. These 
concepts have long provided predictions and understanding and are now a part of common 
sense.” There’s a deeply held belief among most people that emotions are easily categorized. 
Additionally, almost all the research on emotions have focused on what a layman may call a 
“simple” emotion: a basic emotion that we believe all people possess, no matter what their 
culture of level of cognitive and emotional intelligence. Researchers may be concentrating on 
scowls and smiles, or the physiological processes that combine as a fight of flight response, but 
the layman simply understands it as research on anger, or happiness, or fear. 
Other researchers have found that individuals create their own taxonomy, and that 
simple and complex emotions tend to overlap between subjects (Demoulin et al., 2004). Further 
research on emotional categorization suggests that people categorize emotions naturally, as this 
is a useful heuristic to use in everyday life (Rodríguez-Torres, 2005).   
It seems as though people categorize emotions as uniquely human (secondary) or 
universal (primary) whether or not there is a biological factor to the emotions themselves. This 
is particularly important for infrahumanization, as bias is rarely about how the world is, but how 
the world is perceived.  
Emotional Literacy 
As a result of Demoulin et al. (2004) and Rodríguez-Torres’s (2005), we propose that 
emotional literacy is an important part of infrahumanization. Emotional literacy here refers to 
individuals’ understanding of the definitions of emotions, their personal experience with these 
emotions, and their rating of the complexity of emotions.  
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Most likely, a high rate of emotional literacy will lead to high infrahumanization – that is, 
if people understand the definitions of emotions, and agree with the normative categorizations 
of complex (secondary) and simple (primary) emotions, they will exhibit infrahumanization 
toward out-group members. However, if they do not understand the emotions or are unable to 
rate their complexity, it would undermine testing for infrahumanization. Furthermore, if they 
have a non-normative view of the complexity of emotions (for example, rating guilt as a simple 
emotion and rage as complex), they may exhibit infrahumanization within their emotional 
heuristic, even if it does not conform to other subjects’ views of complex and simple emotions. 
In other words, if they believe that guilt is a simple emotion when most subjects view it as 
complex, and they then ascribe guilt to the out-group at a high rate, they are still using 
infrahumanization to exhibit bias. This allows us to control for individual differences when 
testing for infrahumanization. 
To our knowledge, this has not been studied as part of infrahumanization before. 
Generally, researchers use the difference of emotion and sentiments in romance languages, 
which generally separate primary and secondary emotions, respectively (as in Leyens et al., 
2000; Rohmann et al., 2009). In English, researchers tend to use a pilot study in which subjects 
rate the complexity of emotions, from which the results are used to categorize primary and 
secondary emotions in subsequent studies (as in Cuddy, Rock & Norton, 2007). Although both of 
these methods may yield a list of primary and secondary emotions which generally apply to 
subjects of similar language and background, they do not account for individual differences, and 
may not show realistic results for a heterogeneous subject pool.  
Empathy 
Additionally, one of the ways infrahumanization effects intergroup relations is by 
changing or decreasing the way people show empathy toward members of the out-group (Vaes 
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et al., 2003). Again, this study showed how people reacted when an out-group member 
complained when attributing simple or complex emotions to themselves. However, this slim 
research does not clearly indicate whether or not an individual person’s capacity for empathy 
effects their predisposition toward infrahumanization, only whether or not people as a group 
show less empathy as a result of infrahumanization.  
For the past several decades, researchers have recognized empathy as a multifaceted 
construct. Davis (1983) first measured empathy as combination of a cognitive dimension and an 
affective dimension. In his original research, cognitive empathy was a combination of 
perspective taking (thinking through others’ situations to understand their emotions) and 
fantasy (putting oneself into a situation and thinking through the emotional repercussions of 
those situations). Affective empathy, on the other hand, is composed of empathic concern 
(feeling “other-oriented” emotions such as sympathy and concern) and personal distress (feeling 
personally uncomfortable in situations that are emotionally stressful for others) (Davis, 1983). 
Although these four original scales have grown into the two distinct categories of cognitive and 
affective empathy, much of the current research is still based very heavily on this model of 
empathy. 
The cognitive aspect of empathy, particularly, may be important in understanding how 
people ascribe emotional responses to others. Ickes (1993) discussed the difference between 
“affective sensitivity” and “empathic accuracy” as the ability to simply infer emotional states, as 
opposed to the “ability to accurately infer the specific content of another person’s thoughts and 
feelings.” That is, affective sensitivity, is feeling oriented, and mirrors Davis’ (1983) affective 
empathy, whereas empathic accuracy allows one to understand and ascribe exact emotions to 
another person based on contextual knowledge. Ickles did several studies which explored 
people’s capacity for empathic accuracy, comparing them to self-report tools such as Davis’s 
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(1983), finding that people often do not know how accurate their empathic accuracy, or 
cognitive empathy is, but also showing that this inferential, cognitive dimension is important to 
empathy. As a result, this research helped create a framework for cognitive empathy as it’s 
currently understood and studied. 
Currently, cognitive empathy has been crystalized as the facet of empathy which 
requires a cognitive component, or the ability to think through and understand what another 
person is feeling (Teding van Berkhout & Malouff, 2016). It is related to affective empathy, at 
least as people experience it (Kerem, Fishman, & Josselson, 2001), but perspective taking and 
understanding others’ emotions are still studied as part of the cognitive component of the 
greater phenomenon (Vachon & Lynam, 2016).  
Behaviors correlated to empathy are not always as clear-cut as laypeople would believe. 
A meta-analysis recently showed that empathy is not a reliable predictor of aggression in 
psychological studies (Vachon, Lynam, & Johnson, 2014). The authors hypothesize that either 
the link between aggression and empathy may not exist, or that there may be measurement 
issues in the studies used for their meta-analysis. Although they have gone on to test a new tool 
for measuring empathy (Vachon & Lynam, 2016), there is as of yet no research to refute the 
findings of their meta-analysis. 
Likewise, there is little proof of capacity for or use of empathy as an individual trait 
being related to racism. Myriad studies have shown that increasing empathic concern may 
decrease prejudice in study participants (such as Clore & Jeffery, 1972; Zembylas , 2012; Shih, 
Stotzer & Gutiérrez, 2013). However, little, if anything, has been studied to show that a person’s 
general level of empathy – either empathic capacity or the use of empathy – may predict racial 
bias. It is not clear if that is because there is no link between empathy and race, or because no 
within-subject designed studies have looked into the relationship between race and empathy. In 
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any case, the possibility of individual empathy relating to implicit racism is particularly intriguing 
for infrahumanization, which is a form of racial bias which revolves around understanding the 
emotional states of others.  
Since infrahumanization is based on ascription of others emotions, it would be logical 
that people with higher capacity for perspective taking, or cognitive empathy more generally, 
would also be more able to ascribe complex emotions to others in various situations. If this is 
true, these people may show more infrahumanization, because they would be more likely to be 
able to ascribe a high level of secondary emotions to their in-group. However, emotional bias 
against the out-group would theoretically prevent them from using those skills when evaluating 
them. 
To our knowledge, this theory has not yet been tested in the literature. Part of this 
research study would be to test this theory, and expand upon it in subsequent studies if a 
difference is found. 
Hypotheses 
For this experiment, we aim to exhibit infrahumanization, and to discover if people with 
higher cognitive empathy scores, and who have emotional literacy for more complex emotions 
will exhibit more infrahumanization toward out-groups than those with lower empathy and 
emotional literacy scores. Our hypotheses are: 
1. Infrahumanization will be displayed at the individual level when subjects are asked 
to identify the emotions of several people of different races. 
2. People with empathic capacity, and specifically high cognitive empathy will also 
show high instances of infrahumanization, because they will use that empathy more 
on those of the in-group than those of the out-group. 
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3. Infrahumanization is a phenomenon that happens only when assessing people in 
their out-group, and therefore should not be generally correlated with the anti-
social behaviors tested in the Dark Triad of Personality: Machiavellianism, 
Narcissism, and Psychopathy.  
If these hypotheses are supported by our research, we believe we will have shown that 
not only is the phenomenon of infrahumanization measurable in individuals, but that it is 
correlated to other intersections of racial bias and emotion in current psychological literature. 
Methodology 
Pilot 
Pilot Methodology 
For the pilot, we had 69 Montclair State University undergraduate students participate 
in an online survey for psychology class credit. We asked them first to rate all of our emotions 
on a 1 to 5 scale for emotional complexity, where 1 rated a simple emotion, and 5 rated a 
complex one. We also had them read each of our 8 vignettes, which had been stripped of names 
and ethnic connotations. They were asked to choose up to 5 emotions which the protagonist 
would be feeling in each one, and then to rate on a five point scale how intense the emotional 
response to the situation would be, and how complex the situation was. We added these last 
two questions in order to test for any differences in the vignettes which may change their 
balance once they were assigned to racial groups in the larger study.  
Pilot Analysis 
To analyze emotions, mean complexity scores and standard deviation of each emotion 
over all participants was calculated, as shown in Table 1.  
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Table 1. 
Emotion 
Average 
Complexity 
Standard 
Deviation 
 Emotion 
(Continued) 
Average 
Complexity 
Standard 
Deviation 
Resentful 3.52 1.09  Dismay 2.93 0.99 
Hope 3.42 1.29  Intrigued 2.93 1.03 
Attraction 3.39 1.25  Optimism 2.93 1.13 
Dispirited 3.38 1.20  Indignant 2.91 1.03 
Nostalgia 3.30 1.23  Horrified 2.87 1.22 
Shame 3.28 1.30  Irritated 2.80 1.20 
Melancholy 3.13 1.24  Terrified 2.78 1.17 
Betrayed 3.13 1.24  Elation 2.72 1.01 
Nervous 3.13 1.40  Panicked 2.72 1.17 
Jealous 3.09 1.54  Disappointment 2.70 1.33 
Sadness 3.07 1.55  Baffled 2.65 0.94 
Distress 3.06 1.24  Embarrassed 2.62 1.36 
Guilty 3.06 1.38  Disgusted 2.59 1.25 
Resignation 3.06 1.26  Excitement 2.55 1.40 
Sorrow 3.04 1.23  Eager 2.51 1.02 
Tenderness 3.04 1.17  Impatient 2.50 1.06 
Anger 3.03 1.47  Alarmed 2.46 1.18 
Affectionate 3.01 1.31  Happy 2.45 1.52 
Worried 3.00 1.20  Surprised 2.30 1.10 
Sympathy 2.99 1.23  Playful 2.13 1.14 
 
Scores of all 40 emotions were collapsed to show the full range of scores between 
emotions, as summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2. 
 Count 
Mean Avg.  
Complexity  
Minimum 
Avg. 
Complexity 
Maximum 
Avg. 
Complexity 
Standard 
Deviation 
All Emotions 40 2.9 2.13 3.52 0.319 
 
To ensure analysis of only relevant emotions, the researchers counted the number of 
times each emotion was used to describe the protagonists’ feelings, and all emotions that were 
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chosen less than 16 times (that is, less than twice per vignette on average across all 69 
participants) were discounted from the study. These emotions were: Attraction, Nostalgia, 
Jealous, Optimism, Elation, Excitement, Happy, and Playful.  
Of the remaining 32 emotions, we then identified those in the top quartile of average 
complexity ratings,: Resentful, Hope, Dispirited, Shame, Melancholy, Betrayed, Nervous, and 
Sadness.   
For each vignette, the complex and simple emotions were counted. Table 3 shows these 
counts, as well as the average Emotional Complexity Score, and the overall intensity and 
complexity participants assigned to the vignettes. 
Table 3. 
 Vignette 
(Pair) 
# 
Complex 
Emotions 
# Simple 
Emotions 
Emotional 
Complexity 
Rating  
Vignette 
Intensity 
Score 
Vignette 
Complexity 
Score 
Vignette 1 (A) 105 52 2.96 4.29 3.81 
Vignette 2 (B) 75 68 2.93 3.39 3.16 
Vignette 3 (B) 89 103 2.93 3.19 3.07 
Vignette 4 (A) 108 29 2.99 4.51 4.57 
Vignette 5 42 111 2.83 3.78 3.72 
Vignette 6 138 69 3.02 3.30 2.70 
Vignette 7 (C) 50 90 2.87 3.52 3.00 
Vignette 8 (C) 55 95 2.84 4.32 4.06 
Pilot Discussion 
Since infrahumanization is based on the assignment of complex emotions to others, the 
count of complex emotions was used to choose how vignettes would be assigned in the 
experiment.  Two vignettes – Vignettes 5 & 6 – were outliers, with extremely low and extremely 
high counts, respectively.  The other vignettes paired off well, with Pairing A having 105 & 108 
complex emotions assigned; Pairing B having 75 & 89 assigned; and Pairing C having 50 & 55 
assigned. For each of these pairings, one character would be assigned a prototypically black 
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name, and one would be assigned a white name. If infrahumanization is not shown, these pairs 
will continue to match in the experiment as well as the pilot.   
Experiment 
Subjects 
We invited undergraduate students from a public university to engage in this within-
subjects designed experiment. Sign-ups were opened in short periods, over the summer and fall 
of 2016. After each sign-up period, total counts of participants were checked. Once the total 
exceeded 100, sign ups were closed and analysis was begun.  
Of the 153 participants who completed it, 14 were African American/black, 79 were 
white, and the remaining 60 were of other or multiple races or ethnicities. The third group did 
not read vignettes which featured characters of their own race, and we were therefore unable 
to test whether or not they were displaying infrahumanization, but their data was used in the 
Emotional Literacy portion of the analysis. This gave us a total of 93 white and African 
American/black participants whose data was used for the entire study. Table 4 shows the 
breakdown of all participants by race and gender. 
Table 4. 
Participants Female Male Grand Total 
African American or Black 13 1 14 
White 64 15 79 
American Indian or Alaska Native 1 0 1 
Asian 6 0 6 
Hispanic 30 4 34 
Other 4 1 5 
Two or more races 13 1 14 
Total 131 22 153 
Measures 
We created a within-subjects experiment to test for infrahumanization using a series of 
vignettes. We also used a battery of other tests to find what traits correlate with the use of 
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infrahumanization, and therefore what traits may predict that infrahumanization will be used by 
an individual.  
 
Emotional Literacy 
In order to rate emotional literacy, subjects were asked questions about various 
emotions, in which they (a) rated them as positive, negative or neutral, (b) rated their 
complexity on a scale of 1 to 5, and (c) rated how often they’ve experienced this emotion, if 
ever.  
Vignettes 
We then conducted an experiment to see if we could find evidence of 
infrahumanization. We used Cuddy, Rock & Norton’s (2007) experimental design using vignettes 
as a basis, but with an updated design to allow for a within-subjects analysis.  We had each 
participant read a series of six vignettes about white people and people of color in emotional 
situations – specifically, the race of the vignette main character was the independent variable, 
which could be either the in-group or out-group race of the participant. Vignettes subject areas 
were all negative, as they seem to induce the most extreme emotions, and included themes 
such as unplanned pregnancy, becoming the victim of a crime, arrest and suicide. Using the 
pilot, these vignettes were paired so that the emotional complexity of both ingroup and 
outgroup vignettes were equal. Participants were told the race of each character using 
prototypically black or white names, which were chosen based off Conaway & Bethune’s (2015) 
analysis of names based on race. 
Participants were then asked to indicate how the main character of each vignette felt by 
choosing up to five emotions from a standard list. The number of complex emotions chosen was 
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the dependent variable, and was expected to vary depending on whether the vignette subject is 
in the in-group or out-group of the study participants.  
Empathy Tests: Reading the Mind in the Eyes & the Basic Empathy Scale 
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes – Revised Version is a measurements of empathic 
capacity, created in 2001 (Baron-Cohrn, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001). This test asks 
participants to look at a set of eyes, and then choose one of 4 emotions to correspond to the 
expression in the eyes. It tests affective empathy, or the basic recognition of emotion in others, 
not cognitive empathy, and therefore could not be used alone for this research. However, we 
asked participants to take it because the capacity for empathy should be inherent to the ability 
to infrahumanize others, as stated in the second hypothesis. 
Additionally, the Basic Empathy Scale in Adults (BES-A) is a self-report tool which tests 
whether or not adults tend to use empathy, with separate subscales for cognitive and affective 
factors (Carré, Stefaniak, D’Ambrosio, Bensalah & Besche-Richard, 2013). We used this test to 
find individuals’ tendency toward cognitive and affective empathy.  
Depending on whether infrahumanization was seen in the main hypothesis, a 
comparison of these scores to infrahumanization scores was planned to support the second 
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, subjects with high scores on the Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes test and the BES will also have higher infrahumanization scores. 
Dark Triad 
Since infrahumanization is hypothesized as only relating to out-group assessments, it 
should not be related to anti-social personalities or behaviors generally. We used the D3-Short 
version of Paulhus’s Dark Triad of Personality Test to test participants for Machiavellianism, 
narcissism, and psychopathy (Paulhus & Jones, 2011). Participants will be asked to read 27 
questions, and will then be asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 5 whether they agree with them.  
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These scores are then added together on three scales, each of which shows one of the three 
anti-social personality traits. For example, participants were asked if they agree with the 
statement, “I like to pick on losers,” ask part of the test for psychopathy, with higher rated 
responses indicating a higher level of this trait, and if they agree with, “Make sure your plans 
benefit you, not others,” in order to test their level of Machiavellianism. 
The third and final hypothesis states that, “Infrahumanization is a phenomenon that 
happens only when assessing people in their out-group, and therefore should not be generally 
correlated with the anti-social behaviors tested in the Dark Triad of Personality: 
Machiavellianism, Narcissism, and Psychopathy.” These test scores on all three factors were be 
compared to infrahumanization scores in order to see whether or not infrahumanization is 
correlated with these anti-social personality traits. 
Results 
Emotional Ratings 
For the analysis, we first looked at the Emotional Literacy scores for complexity in order 
to check to see if participants rated emotions substantially different than the majority group. 
Each individual emotion was looked at to find a norm – however, no norms were found. Table 5 
(next page) shows the count of scores for each emotion, as well as the average, minimum, 
maximum and standard deviation for each one.  We also looked at each individual participant in 
order to see if they were assigning a range of complexity to emotions, in order to ascertain if 
they were reading each prompt before answering. We found that all participants showed a 
broad range of emotions, and therefore no participants should be dismissed. Although not 
hypothesized, this anecdotally fits prior research which suggests that concepts of basic and 
secondary emotions are not universal norms. 
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Next, we checked ratings of positivity and negativity of each emotion. Again, there was a 
far greater range of responses than expected, but several emotions were either universally 
rated as positive (such as affectionate and hope) or universally negative (such as anger and 
shame). Table 6 (page 23) shows the ratings of each emotion on this negative/positive scale.  
Although some of these scores show clear outliers (the 1 participant who rated 
affectionate as negative, or the 1 who rated anger as positive, for example), we decided that 
one deviation should not indicate a lack of understanding of the emotions provided. We 
checked each participant to see if they deviated from these norms regularly. In this test, no 
participant deviated from the norm more than 4 times over the course of rating 40 emotions, 
and so we did not remove any participants based on a non-normative understanding of these 
emotions. 
Table 5. 
Emotion  1 2 3 4 5 Mean Minimum Maximum St. Dev. 
Affectionate 24 26 37 38 27 3.12 1 5 1.32 
Alarmed 40 37 48 23 4 2.43 1 5 1.11 
Anger 37 38 33 22 22 2.70 1 5 1.36 
Attraction 16 21 42 39 34 3.36 1 5 1.26 
Baffled 19 37 57 28 6 2.76 1 5 1.03 
Betrayed 28 14 27 48 35 3.32 1 5 1.40 
Disappointment 21 28 49 30 22 3.03 1 5 1.24 
Disgusted 36 31 41 27 15 2.69 1 5 1.29 
Dismay 23 34 50 34 8 2.80 1 5 1.12 
Dispirited 24 26 48 34 20 3.00 1 5 1.25 
Distress 22 36 52 32 10 2.82 1 5 1.12 
Eager 41 32 57 20 2 2.41 1 5 1.06 
Elation 25 36 57 24 9 2.71 1 5 1.10 
Embarrassed 28 37 32 32 23 2.90 1 5 1.34 
Excitement 64 29 25 17 17 2.30 1 5 1.40 
Guilty 31 26 30 31 33 3.06 1 5 1.44 
Happy 71 20 21 25 15 2.30 1 5 1.44 
Hope 18 21 45 29 37 3.31 1 5 1.31 
Horrified 35 29 48 25 13 2.68 1 5 1.24 
Impatient 37 39 35 23 18 2.64 1 5 1.31 
Indignant 12 27 61 33 18 3.12 1 5 1.09 
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Emotion  1 2 3 4 5 Mean Minimum Maximum St. Dev. 
Intrigued 18 43 48 28 14 2.85 1 5 1.14 
Irritated 25 35 46 34 12 2.82 1 5 1.18 
Jealous 29 25 40 32 26 3.01 1 5 1.35 
Melancholy 12 30 59 29 20 3.10 1 5 1.11 
Nervous 29 35 27 35 26 2.96 1 5 1.38 
Nostalgia 13 21 44 33 40 3.44 1 5 1.25 
Optimism 15 25 43 43 25 3.25 1 5 1.20 
Panicked 30 40 39 29 13 2.70 1 5 1.23 
Playful 73 26 30 15 8 2.07 1 5 1.24 
Resentful 13 22 38 52 27 3.38 1 5 1.18 
Resignation 14 30 49 34 24 3.16 1 5 1.19 
Sadness 49 31 31 22 19 2.55 1 5 1.39 
Shame 22 33 43 36 17 2.95 1 5 1.22 
Sorrow 17 40 47 22 24 2.97 1 5 1.23 
Surprise 50 45 32 19 6 2.25 1 5 1.15 
Sympathy 17 30 28 46 31 3.29 1 5 1.30 
Tenderness 18 37 51 29 14 2.89 1 5 1.14 
Terrified 41 39 43 18 9 2.43 1 5 1.18 
Worried 22 30 40 32 28 3.09 1 5 1.31 
 
Vignettes 
For the vignettes, we removed all participants who did not identify as either white or 
African American/black. This allowed us to concentrate only on individuals with both in-group 
and out-group characters portrayed in the vignettes. 
Individual Heuristics Vignette Analysis 
Since we had access to our participants’ individual emotional complexity ratings, and 
since we wanted to better understand these individual heuristics, we first coded complex and 
simple emotions by individual, instead of using a master list of emotional categories for the 
group. We then looked at the emotions ascribed to characters in each vignette, and counted 
how many emotions that each participant thought was complex was ascribed to the characters. 
If a participant rated an emotion as having a complexity score of 4 or 5 out of 5 in the initial 
emotional complexity test, we counted that emotion as complex according to the individual. 
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Table 6. 
Emotion Negative Neutral Positive 
 Emotion 
(Continued) Negative Neutral Positive 
Affectionate 1 13 138  Indignant 63 84 6 
Alarmed 46 94 12  Intrigued 6 87 60 
Anger 133 18 1  Irritated 132 20 1 
Attraction 1 53 98  Jealous 121 30 2 
Baffled 31 119 2  Melancholy 62 74 17 
Betrayed 145 6 1  Nervous 64 85 4 
Disappointment 141 8 3  Nostalgia 64 85 4 
Disgusted 140 10 2  Optimism 5 21 127 
Dismay 128 22 2  Panicked 117 36 0 
Dispirited 132 19 1  Playful 0 18 135 
Distress 129 22 2  Resentful 132 18 3 
Eager 6 61 85  Resignation 84 66 3 
Elation 11 64 78  Sadness 131 21 1 
Embarrassed 95 57 1  Shame 139 14 0 
Excitement 0 11 142  Sorrow 119 34 0 
Guilty 129 22 2  Surprise 1 78 74 
Happy 0 5 148  Sympathy 16 80 57 
Hope 0 22 130  Tenderness 4 73 75 
Horrified 130 22 1  Terrified 132 19 2 
Impatient 67 84 1  Worried 102 48 3 
 
Table 7 shows the count of complex emotions for each vignette by both participant race 
and the race of the characters in the vignettes. The pairs, A-C, denoted next to each vignette 
indicate the pairing from the pilot study. 
In this table, we expected black participants to assign more complex emotions to black 
characters than white characters, but we actually saw an equal number of emotions assigned 
between races. We expected white participants to assign more complex emotions to white 
characters than black, but we actually saw the opposite; white participants assigned 380 
complex emotions to black characters, but only 346 to white characters. 
Table 7.  
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 Vignette (Pair) 
Participant Race 
Black White 
Black Character 79 380 
Vignette 1 (A) 25 134 
Vignette 3 (B) 24 121 
Vignette 4 (C) 30 125 
White Character 79 346 
Vignette 2 (A) 27 122 
Vignette 5 (B) 29 114 
Vignette 6 (C) 23 110 
 
We then took these counts and collapsed them into two frequencies per participant: 
frequencies of complex emotions chosen in both the ingroup and outgroup groups. The 
difference between these counts were analyzed to test the first hypothesis: if the in-group was 
ascribed more complex emotions than the out-group, the larger frequencies would show 
infrahumanization. 
Each participant could choose up to 15 emotions for each the ingroup and outgroup 
conditions; therefore, the participants could choose anywhere from -15 to +15 more complex 
emotions for the ingroup condition as compared to the outgroup condition, with higher positive 
numbers indicating a higher likelihood of bias being shown through infrahumanization.  Table 8 
shows frequencies for each difference in complex emotions between vignette groups by 
individual.  
In all, 36 participants (38.7%) ascribed more complex emotions to the in-group 
condition, 36 participants (38.7%) ascribed more complex emotions to the out-group condition, 
and 21 (22.6%) exhibited no difference between groups.  
 
 
Table 8. 
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Increase in Complex Emotions in In-Group Condition Frequency Percent 
-5 2 2.2% 
-4 2 2.2% 
-3 9 9.7% 
-2 9 9.7% 
-1 14 15.1% 
0 21 22.6% 
1 17 18.3% 
2 12 12.9% 
3 6 6.5% 
4 1 1.1% 
Total 93 100% 
 
Pilot List of Emotions Vignette Analysis 
Because we had the data from the pilot, which was originally planned as a master list for 
complex and simple emotions, we did the same analysis using this list instead of individual 
emotional ratings. Using a small, uniform list of complex emotions - Resentful, Hope, Dispirited, 
Shame, Melancholy, Betrayed, Nervous, and Sadness – complex emotions were once again 
counted and organized by the race of the participant and characters, as shown in table 10. 
Again, black participants were expected to rate black characters as having more 
complex emotions, and in this case they did: black participants rated black characters as having 
51 complex emotions, as opposed to only 43 for white characters. However, we did not see that 
white participants rated white characters with more complex emotions; they assigned 233 
complex emotions to black characters, but only 229 to white characters. 
 
 
 
 
Table 10. 
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 Vignette (Pair) 
Participant Race 
Black White 
Black Character 51 233 
Vignette 1 (A) 24 81 
Vignette 3 (B) 10 86 
Vignette 4 (C) 17 66 
White Character 43 229 
Vignette 2 (A) 22 110 
Vignette 5 (B) 9 53 
Vignette 6 (C) 12 66 
 
We then collapsed these emotion counts as well. Once again, we looked at the 
difference in complex emotions chosen in all in-group conditions compared to complex 
emotions chosen in all out-group conditions, expecting that more individuals ascribed more 
complex emotions to their in-group than to the out-group over the course of all conditions. 
Table 11 shows the results of this. 
Table 11. 
Increase in Complex Emotions in In-Group 
Condition 
Frequency Percent 
-4 2 2.2% 
-3 1 1.1% 
-2 8 8.6% 
-1 19 20.4% 
0 17 18.3% 
1 15 16.1% 
2 19 20.4% 
3 8 8.6% 
4 3 3.2% 
5 1 1.1% 
Total 93 100% 
 
Using this list of complex emotions, we found that more participants ascribed a greater 
number of complex emotions to their in-group than those who ascribed more to the out-group. 
Here, 30 participants (32.3%) ascribed more complex emotions to the out-group, as opposed to 
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46 participants (49.5%) who ascribed more complex emotions to their in-group. Another 17 
(18.3%) ascribed an equal number of complex emotions to each group. 
Empathy Tests: Reading the Mind in the Eyes & the Basic Empathy Scale 
In order to analyze how infrahumanization and empathy interact, we planned to use the 
individual results of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes and the Basic Empathy Scale. Levels of 
infrahumanization – that is, difference in complex emotions chosen between the ingroup and 
outgroup conditions of the vignettes – were hypothesized to correlate with empathic capacity in 
the Mind in the Eyes Test, and with cognitive empathy in the Basic Empathy Scale. Table 13 
shows the scores of both tests, including the affective empathy scale of the BES; note that this 
affective scale was not used in the analysis.  
Table 13. 
Test  Mean Minimum Maximum St. Dev. 
Mind in the Eyes 24.95 14 34 4.12 
BES – Affective 27.60 12 55 7.81 
BES - Cognitive 22.90 11 45 6.85 
 
Correlation to infrahumanization is tested later in the analysis, as part of a regression 
analysis. 
Dark Triad 
We also hypothesized that infrahumanization would not be correlated to anti-social 
personality traits, as tested by the Dark Triad of Personality test. Table 14 shows the scores for 
each of these tested traits, along with the same correlation measure as used in Table 13. 
 
Table 14. 
Test  Mean Minimum Maximum St. Dev. 
Machiavellianism 26.35 14 45 5.57 
Narcissism 27.42 11 41 5.39 
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Psychopathy 35.17 19 45 6.77 
 
We once again deferred our correlation analysis to later in the research, under the 
Inferential Statistics heading. 
Inferential Statistics 
We broke our original hypotheses into 3 linked hypotheses in order to analyze the 
vignettes and other tests together. These were: 
H1: People rate ingroup emotions differently than outgroup emotions. 
H2: People will rate more complex emotions to the ingroup as opposed to the outgroup 
(infrahumanization). 
H3: Race, gender, empathy and anti-social personality traits, as rated in our other tests, 
will be predictive of infrahumanization. 
The following two sets of analyses test these hypotheses using two sets of complex 
emotions. In the first case, emotions are rated as complex if the individual in question rated 
them as complex; again, this allows us to take advantage of understanding individuals’ rating 
through this study. We call this the Individual Heuristic analysis. In the second case, the list of 
complex emotions identified by the pilot study is used; this is the method used most often in 
English studies of Infrahumanization, since no authoritative list of emotional complexity exists. 
Individual Heuristics of Emotions Analysis 
H1: People rate ingroup emotions differently than outgroup emotions. 
For the first hypothesis, we used a repeated measures MANOVA to detect differences 
between how white participants and black participants were rated simple and complex 
emotions in in-group and out-group vignette characters. For this, our independent variables 
were (1) participant race and (2) vignette character race, and our dependent variables were (1) 
count of simple emotions and (2) count of complex emotions. These independent variables were 
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treated as repeated measures because each participant selected both within each vignette, and 
were combined into an “Emotions” factor. 
For this analysis, we found no main interaction between Emotions and Participant Race 
(Wilks’ Λ = .992, p = .236), no main interaction between Emotions and Ingroup/Outgroup 
designation (Wilks’ Λ = 1.000, p = .859), and no interaction between Emotions, Participant Race, 
and Ingroup/Outgroup designation (Wilks’ Λ = 1.000, p = .973). 
H2: People will rate more complex emotions to the ingroup as opposed to the outgroup 
(infrahumanization). 
In order to analyze infrahumanization, we used a 2x2 Chi Square model. For this, we 
counted the number of participants of each race who assigned more complex emotions to 
characters of each race, as shown in Table 15. 
Table 15 
Participant Race 
Assigned more Complex Emotions to: 
Black Characters White Characters 
Black  7 6 
White 30 29 
 
Here, we once again found no significant difference in how individuals rated in-group 
and out-group characters, in terms of simple and complex emotions (x2 = .038, p = .845).  
H3: Race, gender, empathy and anti-social personality traits, as rated in our other 
tests, will be predictive of infrahumanization. 
We used a linear regression analysis to test whether or not we could predict 
infrahumanization individuals. Our dependent variable was the difference between complex 
emotions attributed to the ingroup versus complex emotions attributed to the outgroup by each 
individual. The frequencies of each of these outcomes are shown in Table 8 above. 
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Our predictor variables for this regression were (1) race, (2) gender, (3) cognitive 
empathy score from the BES, (4) empathic capacity from the Mind in the Eyes test, (4) 
Machiavellianism from the Dark Triad Test, (5) Narcissism from the Dark Triad Test, and (6) 
Psychopathy from the Dark Triad Test. We hypothesized that cognitive empathy and empathic 
capacity would be predictive of infrahumanization, and that the Dark Triad traits would not be 
predicative. Additionally, race and gender were added as post-hoc tests.   
No significant regression equations was found (F(7,85) = .616, p = .742), with an R2 of 
.048. Table 16 shows the correlations of all these variables to each other, using Spearman’s rho. 
Table 16. 
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Race 1.000         
Gender .112 1.000        
Infra-
humanization 
.019 -.013 1.000       
Mind in the 
Eyes 
-.096 .089 .040 1.000      
Affective 
Empathy 
.019 -.166 -
.329* 
-.106 1.000     
Cognitive 
Empathy 
.207* -.025 .093 -.147 .496* 1.000    
Machia-
vellianism 
-.088 .063 -.109 .080 .016 .056 1.000   
Narcissism -.319* .090 -.047 .154 .032 .123 .159 1.000  
Psychopathy -.174 .151 .115 .266* -.188 .204* .349* .282* 1.000 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
Pilot List of Emotions Analysis 
H1: People rate ingroup emotions differently than outgroup emotions. 
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Once again, we used a repeated measures MANOVA to detect differences between how 
white participants and black participants were rated simple and complex emotions in in-group 
and out-group vignette characters. However, for this analysis, these categories of simple and 
complex emotions came from the list we found in the pilot. Our independent variables were (1) 
participant race and (2) vignette character race, and our dependent variables were (1) count of 
simple emotions and (2) count of complex emotions. Again, these independent variables were 
treated as repeated measures because each participant selected both within each vignette, and 
were combined into an “Emotions” factor. 
For this analysis, we again found no interaction between Emotions and Participant Race 
(Wilks’ Λ = .995, p = .324), no interaction between Emotions and Ingroup/Outgroup designation 
(Wilks’ Λ = .994, p = .303), and no interaction between Emotions, Participant Race, and 
Ingroup/Outgroup designation (Wilks’ Λ = .996, p = .406). 
H2: People will rate more complex emotions to the ingroup as opposed to the outgroup 
(infrahumanization). 
In order to analyze infrahumanization, we again used a 2x2 Chi Square model. As in the 
last analysis, we counted the number of participants of each race who assigned more complex 
emotions to characters of each race, as shown in Table 17.  
Table 17 
Participant Race 
Assigned more Complex Emotions to: 
Black Characters White Characters 
Black  9 4 
White 27 37 
 
Although more participants did assign more complex emotions to characters of their 
own race than the other race, this difference was not found to be significant (x2 = 2.181, p = 
.140).  
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H3: Race, gender, empathy and anti-social personality traits, as rated in our other 
tests, will be predictive of infrahumanization. 
Finally, we used another linear regression analysis to test whether or not we could 
predict infrahumanization individuals. Again, our definitions remained the same, with only the 
categorization of emotions changing. Our dependent variable was the difference between 
complex emotions attributed to the ingroup versus complex emotions attributed to the 
outgroup by each individual. The frequencies of each of these outcomes are shown in Table 11 
above. 
Our predictor variables for this regression were (1) race, (2) gender, (3) cognitive 
empathy score from the BES, (4) empathic capacity from the Mind in the Eyes test, (4) 
Machiavellianism from the Dark Triad Test, (5) Narcissism from the Dark Triad Test, and (6) 
Psychopathy from the Dark Triad Test. We hypothesized that cognitive empathy and empathic 
capacity would be predictive of infrahumanization, and that the Dark Triad traits would not be 
predicative. Additionally, race and gender were added as post-hoc tests.   
No significant regression equations was found (F(7,85) = .825, p = .569), with an R2 of 
.064. Table 18 shows the correlations of all of these tests, using Spearman’s rho. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 18. 
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Race 1.000         
Gender .112 1.000        
Infra-
humanization 
.091 -.131 1.000       
Mind in the 
Eyes 
-.096 .089 .004 1.000      
Affective 
Empathy 
.019 -.166 -.164 -.106 1.000     
Cognitive 
Empathy 
.207* -.025 .259* -.147 .496* 1.000    
Machia-
vellianism 
-.088 .063 -.070 .080 .016 .056 1.000   
Narcissism -.319* .090 -.051 .154 .032 .123 .159 1.000  
Psychopathy -.174 .151 -.090 .266* -.188 .204* .349* .282* 1.000 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
Discussion 
As hypothesized, we expected to find that individuals would tend to display 
infrahumanization when exposed to a number of situations in which they had to assess the 
emotional states of people in their in-group or in their out-group. We wrote several vignettes, 
and paired them by emotional complexity in our pilot study. For each pair, we assigned one to 
the in-group and one to the out-group for each of our participants. 
We further expected that the tendency toward infrahumanization would be correlated 
to emotional understanding and empathy, and would not be correlated to more general anti-
social traits which did not have to do with bias against an out-group. We gave our participants a 
set of tests which scored their empathy and empathic capacity, as well as the Dark Triad of 
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Personality Test, and used a regression analysis to see if these scores had any relationship to a 
participant’s tendency toward infrahumanization. 
We used two definitions of complex or secondary emotions: (a) emotions that the 
individual participants listed as complex, and (b) a standard list of emotions identified as 
complex in our pilot study. Although the latter is standard in the literature, we surmised that the 
first definition would most accurately show individual instances of infrahumanization. 
For both definitions, we found no difference in patterns of complex and simple 
emotions attributed to characters in the ingroup or outgroup. Nor did we find a difference when 
we isolated participants’ race using our chi square test. These combined results allowed us to 
conclude that there was no evidence of infrahumanization illuminated by this study. 
Furthermore, we continued the analysis to see if empathy or anti-social traits were 
related to the non-significant differences in complex emotions ascribed to either the in-group or 
the out-group. We found no evidence of any relationships between these factors.  
There were several limitations to this study, not in the least of which was the definition 
of secondary or complex emotions. Given evidence from Demoulin et al. (2004), as well as an 
overwhelming lack of consensus in the psychological literature regarding the taxonomy of basic 
or simple emotions versus complex or secondary emotions, we struggled to define these 
categories. Psychological science has not yet created a conclusive theory of emotions, whether 
some are biologically based and some are not (as in Panskeep, 1998; Elkman, 1999), or all 
emotions are constructed from a mix of biological core affect and cognitive influence (as in 
Russell, 2003; Russell, 2009; Barrett, 2011), or if such a theory should have a more complex 
dimension such as the valence of cognitive input into an emotional reaction (as in Moors, 2013; 
Moors, 2014). In the end, we used two methods of emotional categorization – one of our own 
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devising and one present in much of the literature – neither of which had strong empirical 
evidence behind them.   
The use of two definitions made this study particularly interesting. The usual structure 
of these studies, which utilizes pilot data, showed a pattern of infrahumanization, though it was 
not significant. There was no theoretical or a priori reason that this list would be more useful 
than the list of emotions chosen by the participants of the main experiment, though. When 
participants of the main experiment chose their own definitions of complex emotions, there was 
no discernable pattern of infrahumanization at all. This data is inconclusive on its own, but 
nonetheless suggests that there may be some pattern of infrahumanization which may come 
from a standard list of emotions, but which was not fully developed by the pilot.  
It would be fruitful to use different theories of emotion – affect theory and 
constructionist theory, for example – to inform our analysis, much as we did with our two lists. 
This would allow us to directly compare these theories, so we may see which, if any, support 
emotional bias via infrahumanization. Since there is so much debate over which emotional 
theories are correct, it would be useful to see if they are able to detect a phenomenon such as 
infrahumanization. Instead of spending so much time looking for a definitive taxonomy of 
emotions, it would be useful to use an analysis like this to compare current contrasting theories. 
In a related struggle, the language difference between those who originally proposed 
infrahumanization and the current authors created a profound barrier in this study. In the 
romance languages, there is a known cultural distinction between emotion (universal emotions) 
and sentiments (uniquely human emotions) (as in Leyens et al., 2000; Rohmann et al., 2009). In 
English, there is no such universal cultural divide. This makes it difficult to assess bias based on 
the humanness of an emotional appraisal, leaving infrahumanization much vaguer in this 
language.  
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Additionally, only two races were represented in the vignettes: black and white. We 
tried to mitigate this limitation by only using data for those participants who had in-group and 
out-group vignette characters to assess. As a result, 60 (39.2%) of participants were disqualified 
from the study. Had Hispanic, Asian or other races been included in the vignettes, more 
participants would have been eligible for analysis, possibly yielding different results. A 
secondary study in a population with similar diversity should use a greater range of vignettes, 
with characters of more races to test this proposed phenomenon. 
There are still many questions remaining about infrahumanization and whether or not it 
may be exhibited as a trait. If participants were asked to read more vignettes, or were asked to 
pick more than five emotions for each vignette, a robust repeated-measures within-subjects 
analysis may be conducted. This study laid out the procedure for how this may work, but had 
too few vignettes and too little variance in the number of complex emotions chosen for each 
vignette character to analyze in this way. Such a study would have much more power, and 
would allow researchers to detect smaller effect sizes between individuals.  
If a larger study was conducted and yielded results, it may also be able to detect a 
relationship between infrahumanization and empathy, as we also hypothesized. This may be a 
secondary study, or may be conducted as a second part of the same study, as we attempted. 
Most importantly, this study tried to determine a direct pathway of measurement for 
infrahumanization. We tried to examine this phenomenon in different ways: through direct 
comparison of how individuals assessed those in the in-group and out-group, as well as via how 
this phenomenon interacted with empathy and other psychological traits. Although our results 
were null, we still find this to be important work. Infrahumanization has been observed in many 
between-subjects experiments, and it is still likely to be observable on an individual basis, 
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particularly in a repeated-measures within-subjects experiment. By taking our learnings from 
this study, we hope to inform the design for further research. 
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